Key takeaways
- The bank examination question about AI has changed. It is no longer “do you have an AI policy” — it is “show me what this agent did, who approved it, and how you stopped it.”
- Examiners apply an established accountability pattern to a new actor: attribution, approval, evidence, and control. Banks that already operate this way for payments and trading answer AI questions with the same records.
- The gap is almost always between policy and evidence. Documents establish intent; per-action records establish execution. Examiners ask for the second.
- Preparation is a records exercise, not a document-writing exercise: inventory, identity, one-query reconstruction, and a tested stop control.
The one-sentence summary
FFIEC examinations now treat AI agents as actors that must be attributable, approved, stoppable, and recorded — and the banks that answer from records rather than reconstructions are the ones that prepared.
From “do you have a policy” to “show me the record”
For years, the AI question in a bank examination ended at the policy document: does the bank have an AI governance framework, who owns model risk, are third-party AI vendors in the register. That question is answered by documents, and most banks have the documents.
SR 26-2 changed the register of the conversation. The Federal Reserve’s guidance on agentic AI extends existing third-party and model risk expectations to agents, and the extension lands on evidence: defined accountability for agent actions, risk assessments proportionate to the agent’s autonomy, evidence that controls ran rather than merely exist, and stop mechanisms that have been tested. An examiner applying SR 26-2 does not ask whether the bank’s AI policy mentions agents. The examiner picks an agent and asks about its actions.
The questions that follow have a consistent shape across examinations:
- Attribution: which agent took this action, and on whose behalf? If the bank’s answer starts with “the service account,” the answer has already failed.
- Approval: who approved this agent’s deployment, and who approves its consequential actions — the payments, the data exports, the external communications? What did the approver see?
- Policy: which version of the policy judged this action, and how do you know?
- Stop: how is this agent stopped if it misbehaves, who may stop it, and when was that last tested? May the person who stopped it also restart it?
- Evidence: show me the record for one completed action, end to end.
None of these are answered by the policy document. All of them are answered by records — if the records exist.
The pattern examiners are applying is not new
Banks have been through this arc for automated trading, payment initiation, and straight-through processing. Distributed actors, delegation, high-consequence actions — and a supervisory demand for attributable actors, central rules, approvals on the consequential actions, and records that reconstruct the chain. Agents are a new class of actor, not a new class of accountability.
The practical consequence: banks that operate attributable, approved, recorded action chains for their existing automated systems can extend the same machinery to agents and answer AI examination questions from the same records. Banks that governed those systems by policy document alone will find agents amplify the gap, because agents act more often and in more directions than any earlier automation.
The five records that answer the exam
Preparation is a records exercise. Five artefacts answer every question in the standard set:
- The agent inventory — every production agent, its named owner, its workflow, and its approval status. Not a spreadsheet of pilots: the register of actors.
- Identity records — each agent’s own credential, scoped and short-lived, with the on-behalf-of chain recorded when it acts for a user. Shared service accounts are the first finding an examiner writes.
- The per-action record — request, policy decision and version, approvals with what the approver saw, tool calls, outcome. Correlated and tamper-evident, retrievable as one query.
- The stop-drill record — when the kill switch was last tested, what stopping blocked, how restart was authorised, and by whom. A stop control that has never been tested is a hypothesis; the drill record is what turns it into a control.
- The exception log — every policy override and exception, who granted it, and what it covered.
Banks holding these five records answer the examination in the session. Banks without them spend staff months reconstructing answers, and reconstruction is what examiners read as an ungoverned program.
What the preparation actually looks like
The sequence that closes the gap before the exam request letter arrives:
- Inventory the agents. One day with IAM exports and workflow owners. Every production agent gets an owner or gets stopped.
- Give each agent its own identity. Shared credentials are the fastest finding to write and the fastest to fix.
- Wire the approvals and the record. Approval gates on irreversible action classes, enforced where the action executes; one correlated record per action.
- Drill the stop control. Staging first, then production in a quiet window, with the drill record kept. The drill takes about 45 minutes on one agent.
- Rehearse the reconstruction. Pick a completed action and reconstruct the chain end to end in one query. If it takes a manual join across log stores, that is the finding — fix it while it is cheap.
The same five steps are what an examiner’s follow-up will ask about, which is why banks that run them once run them on a cadence afterwards.
Where this fits with the rest of the regulatory picture
SR 26-2 and FFIEC expectations are the US banking slice of a global convergence: DORA and the EU AI Act bind EU financial entities to overlapping controls, CPS 230 does the same for Australian financial services, and the seven frameworks map onto four recurring controls. Build the controls once; the framework mappings become documentation.
For the full SR 26-2 examination-evidence picture, the dedicated page covers what the guidance asks in depth; the readiness checklist scores all four control domains in 36 checks; and what Moring does shows the same records produced as a product.
If you need to brief the board before the exam request letter arrives, the AI governance board briefing covers the fiduciary framing and the five questions directors should ask management. The insurance equivalent — state audits under the NAIC model — is covered in how to prepare for a NAIC AI model audit.
Frequently asked questions
What do FFIEC examiners ask about AI agents?
Examiners have moved from asking whether a bank has an AI policy to asking about specific agents: what actions has this agent taken, who approved its deployment and its consequential actions, what record exists of each action, how is it stopped if it misbehaves, and how was the stop tested. The questions follow the same structure regulators apply to other automated systems — attribution, approval, evidence, and control — applied to a new class of actor.
What evidence do banks need for AI agent governance?
Evidence that controls ran, not that they exist: per-action records showing which agent acted, on whose behalf, under which policy version, with which approvals, and what the outcome was — correlated and tamper-evident. Policy documents establish intent; records establish execution. The examination gap is almost always between the two.
How should a bank prepare for an AI examination?
Before the exam: inventory every production agent with a named owner; verify each has its own identity, scoped credentials and an approved policy; test stop controls and keep the drill record; and confirm one query reconstructs a completed action end to end — request, decisions, approvals, tool calls, outcome. Banks that can reconstruct one workflow in minutes answer examination questions in the session; banks that cannot, spend months reconstructing.
How does SR 26-2 change bank AI examinations?
SR 26-2 extends existing third-party and model risk expectations to agentic AI: defined accountability for agent actions, risk assessments proportionate to autonomy, evidence that controls ran, and tested stop mechanisms. Practically it means examiners treat agents as actors requiring attribution and control evidence, not as software deployments — and banks whose records are per-action rather than per-log-file answer cleanly.
What happens if a bank cannot evidence AI agent controls?
The finding is usually written as supervisory concern over unmanaged third-party or operational risk, and its consequences reach past the exam: open findings raise the intensity and length of the next examination, agent programs get paused until findings close, and remediation costs staff months of reconstruction. The cheapest moment to close the gap is before the exam request letter arrives.
Governing Autonomous AI Agents in Production
Moring provides the runtime control layer, identity verification, human-in-the-loop approvals, and audit records needed to deploy production-grade AI agents safely.
