Banking AI agent sandboxing SR 26-2 | Moring
AI agent sandboxing for banking, SR 26-2 alignment: the sources cited below describe how banking teams handle this SR 26-2 alignment question specifically — the mechanics, the evidence and the oversight banking examiners expect at this stage.
Short answer
AI agent sandboxing for banking, SR 26-2 alignment: the sources cited below describe how banking teams handle this SR 26-2 alignment question specifically — the mechanics, the evidence and the oversight banking examiners expect at this stage.
How it works
SR 26-2 alignment of ai agent sandboxing in banking raises questions the general overview does not answer: what banking teams actually deploy at the SR 26-2 alignment stage, which controls that stage adds, and what the cited authorities say about SR 26-2 alignment specifically. The material on this page comes from the listed sources, not from generic definitions.
Per Governing Agentic (ibm.com): "Regulatory Expectations, Best Practices, and Cross Jurisdictional Gaps IBM Promontory This document introduces a governance-architectural contribution to the financial services literature on Generative and Agentic AI. Its central innovation lies in demonstrating that the risks introduced by Agentic AI do not require the invention of a new, AI-specific governance paradigm. Instead, they require a more explicit, continuous, and disciplined application of existing Model Risk Management (MRM) frameworks, fully integrated within the Three Lines of Defence (3LoD) and explicitly connected to established Operational Risk Management (ORM) practices."
Per FSI-AgentGov/docs/controls/pillar-2-management/2.6-model-risk-management-sr-26-2.md at main · judeper/FSI-AgentGov · GitHub (github.com): "The operative citations as of the verification date are **SR 26-2** and **OCC Bulletin 2026-13**. This control supports compliance with OCC Bulletin 2026-13 (formerly OCC Bulletin 2011-12), Federal Reserve SR 26-2 (formerly SR 11-7), FDIC FIL-15-2026, FFIEC IT Handbook, FINRA Rule 3110, FINRA Rule 4511, SEC Rules 17a-3 / 17a-4, SOX §§ 302 / 404, GLBA 501(b), and NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500 by providing a structured framework for treating AI agents as models within the firm's existing MRM program."
Per SR 26-2 Regulates Your Models, Not Your AI Agents: What Banks Need to Know - CIMCON Software (cimcon.com): "SR 26-2 replaces SR 11-7, the framework that has shaped how banks build, validate, and govern models since 2011. This post breaks down exactly what SR 26-2 says, what’s happened since it was issued, and what banks need to put in place now, before the next exam and before the regulatory guidance written specifically for GenAI and agentic AI arrives. It goes on to instruct banks to rely on their own risk management and governance practices to determine appropriate controls for any tools or systems the document doesn’t cover, while confirming that the guidance’s principles do apply to traditional statistical models and to non-generative, non-agentic AI."
Per SR 26-2 Model Risk Management: What Replaced SR 11-7 and What It Means for LLMs and AI Agents | Fiddler AI Blog (fiddler.ai): "Published October 14, 2026 # SR 26-2 Model Risk Management: What Replaced SR 11-7 and What It Means for LLMs and AI Agents ## Key Takeaways * SR 26-2 superseded SR 11-7 and SR 21-8 on April 17, 2026, so an existing SR 11-7 program needs re-papering against the new text rather than retirement. SR 26-2, Revised Guidance on Model Risk Management (MRM), is supervisory guidance issued by the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) on April 17, 2026. For the customer-service agent in this scenario, those controls are: * **Inventory:** The bank should give every LLM application and agent a registry entry with an owner, a lifecycle status and the model version, applying its own governance to systems outside SR 26-2 [4]; a retired agent’s tool credentials should be revoked."
For the control baseline every SR 26-2 alignment decision inherits — named owners, scoped credentials, policy checks before every call and an audit trail no agent can alter — see the main banking ai agent sandboxing page at /topics/banking-sandboxing/. The SR 26-2 alignment specifics above, and the 8 sources cited below, build directly on that baseline for banking.
Frequently asked questions
How should banking teams approach SR 26-2 alignment of ai agent sandboxing?
Start from the sources on this page: they describe how banking organizations handle SR 26-2 alignment of ai agent sandboxing in practice, including the controls and evidence the authorities cite. Apply the control baseline from the parent ai agent sandboxing page first, then layer the SR 26-2 alignment specifics these sources detail.
What makes SR 26-2 alignment of ai agent sandboxing different in banking?
The sources here are selected for banking relevance, so the SR 26-2 alignment guidance reflects the regulatory and operational context banking teams work under, including SR 26-2 and SR 11-7. The underlying mechanics are similar in other industries, but the evidence expectations are stricter for banking deployments.
Which sources back the SR 26-2 alignment guidance for ai agent sandboxing in banking?
The list below covers 8 references selected for this page, from federalreserve.gov to federalreserve.gov. Each is quoted in the body where it bears on SR 26-2 alignment of ai agent sandboxing, so every claim on this page traces to its source.